By: Anthony Aubel

A complete account of a positive theory of induction will need to show how we can be justified in inferring propositions that extend beyond observed phenomena in addition to specifying precise objective criteria by which such claims can be evaluated. I plan to focus on the scope of such criteria in Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’ and show whether his analysis, with regards to testimonies about ‘miracles’, achieves the level of a complete positive inductive theory.

Hume’s analysis in ‘Of Miracles’ provides a psychologically necessary, but objectively insufficient set of criteria for evaluating claims about ‘miracles’ and hence fails to achieve a complete positive theory of induction.

In evaluating the validity of testimonies of supposed ‘miraculous’ events, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to solely regard our past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. For a testimony about a ‘miracle’ to stand on any plausible ground, it must be subjected to objective criteria that can precisely quantify the likelihood of such events consistent with natural laws. As is often the case for scientific objectivity, natural laws must also be able to predict or help us understand matters beyond our direct psychological experience. To show this, I will present two cases of natural laws from the scientific domain; 1) The universal law of gravitation, and 2) Atomic theory. I will argue that, although Hume’s analysis mostly succeeds insofar as establishing empirically constrained criteria necessarily based on our psychological experience, it fails to achieve a complete positive theory of induction due to lack of sufficiently precise objective criteria.

One objection would be that Hume does in fact provide multiple positive criteria that point to a positive account of induction. For instance, Hume proposes using gradients of evidence to mark the strength of testimonies of ‘miracles’ that are proportional to the evidence for and against. He also identifies the type of belief induction can give us. Nonetheless, I would argue that none of the proposals provides sufficient objective criteria that meets the standards of a complete theory of induction. Another objection would be that Hume will not find it justifiable to claim natural laws predicting anything beyond our experience. I would agree with him insofar as this claim is made within the confines of what we find directly observable. I would disagree, however, by appealing to two examples of natural laws that are (scientifically) corroborated through much more stringent criteria that extend, not only far beyond our direct experience, but also the strengths of any testimony to a ‘miracle’.

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