Papers
Representation and Simulation as Essential Tools in Scientific Modeling
Representation is a necessary and essential component in scientific modeling that we cannot do away with if we want to have a plausible explanatory account of phenomena under investigation.
By: Anthony Aubel
MY DISSERTATION: Enhancing Prototype Representation within the Predictive Processing Framework: A Conceptual Spaces Integration
I propose a plausible integration of Conseptual Space Theory (CST) into Michel's hybrid account where I argue that CST's geometrically defined spaces provide the missing representational substrate for Michel's ‘higher-level nodes’ and that this joint approach can significantly expand its explanatory scope.
By: Anthony Aubel
A Critical Evaluation of the Computational Theory of Cognition Hypothesis
I argue against two underlying anti-representationalist views by showing how motivations behind the computational theory of cognition (CTC) do point to a representational theory of cognition that builds upon our commonsense (folk psychological) theories by assigning a central role to representations that make intentional explanations plausible within CTC’s framework.
By: Anthony Aubel
Can one reasonably be a dualist in this day and age?
In this paper, I attempt to defend a form of dualism position that may be reasonable to hold.
By: Anthony Aubel
Is the Mind a Collection of Evolved Cognitive ‘Modules’?
Massive Modularity hypothesis is plausible insofar as it is understood within a mechanistic (sub-personal) level of explanation whereas arguments against it make sense from an intentional (personal level) stance.
By: Anthony Aubel
Is the Mind a Collection of Evolved Cognitive ‘Modules’?
Massive Modularity hypothesis is plausible insofar as it is understood within a mechanistic (sub-personal) level of explanation whereas arguments against it make sense from an intentional (personal level) stance.
By: Anthony Aubel
Should we use psychological predicates in sub-personal explanations?
Although I can see how prima facie the use of intentional predicates in sub-personal explanations can seem to cause conceptual confusions, I argue that B&H’s dismissive proposal severs the continuity relation between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation.
By: Anthony Aubel
Why might we think the mind is not identical to the brain?
Kripke’s argument may reasonably hold true in a logically possible world (as a logical necessity), but it’s questionable whether it can hold true in a physically possible world.
By: Anthony Aubel
The Role of Mirror Neurons in Mindreading: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence for Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory
Mirror neuron activity does not offer convincing evidence in support of Simulation Theory, whereas it lends stronger, albeit limited, support to the Theory-Theory account of mindreading.
By: Anthony Aubel
Challenging the Unified View in Philosophy of Biology: A Defense of a Non-unified Approach to Function
I employ the notion of Wright-Functions and Cummins-Functions coined by Godfrey-Smith to argue that in biological explanations, a dual-perspective is more advantageous than a unified view.
By: Anthony Aubel
To what extent does Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’ outline a positive philosophical theory of induction?
Hume’s analysis in ‘Of Miracles’ provides a psychologically necessary, but objectively insufficient set of criteria for evaluating claims about ‘miracles’ and hence fails to achieve a complete positive theory of induction.
By: Anthony Aubel